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IN TR O D U C TIO N
Research and development (R & D ) and technological change have received
much attention since the fifties, notable examples being Nelson (1959), Hamberg
(1959), Griliches (1962), and Arrow (1962,1969). Since that time several studies
have contributed to this field, theoretically and empirically, by focusing on different
issues related to R& D , such as R& D and productivity growth, the role of R & D in
innovation, market structure and the rate of technological change, fiscal incentives
and R& D , international R & D spillovers, R & D and economic growth, and the
relationship between public and private R&D.
This dissertation focuses on three main issues in the R& D literature:
determinants of R& D , the role of fiscal policy in stimulating private R& D , and
government R & D and economic growth. In the first essay, we study the determinants
of aggregate R & D in both developed and emerging countries. The motivation behind
this study is to identify and compare between developed and emerging countries'
different macroeconomic R & D determinants with special attention to the effect of
patent rights protection and technology transfer. This area is somewhat new in the
R & D literature since it was very difficult in the past to find data on R & D in
developing countries. We are mainly interested in examining if patent protection
helps R & D , and whether technology transfer takes place via trade in intermediate
goods and FD I. We find that patent protection has a positive effect on R & D but
excessive protection can lim it access to new innovations and thus slowdown the rate
of research and development. The effect of technology transfer on domestic R & D is

1
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positive only in countries that depend heavily on imports of intermediate goods and
FD I.
Although the existing R& D literature emphasizes the importance of patent
protection and technology transfer as determinants of R & D , this essay contributes to
the literature by extending the quality ladder model to incorporate patent rights and
their effects on R& D. The model then suggests and the empirics confirm the presence
of a threshold in patent protection beyond which the effect on R & D weakens. And the
semiparametric approach neatly captures the underlying dynamic effects of different
macro variables on R&D. In addition, contrary to Lichtenberg's (2001) findings that
only outward F D I flows and trade in intermediate goods affect domestic R & D , we
find a threshold after which inward FD I flows and imports of intermediate goods
affect domestic R&D.
In the second and the third essays, we disaggregate R & D into two major
subcategories: private and government R&D. The reason behind this disaggregation is
to: 1) study the behavior of each type of R & D and how they respond to different fiscal
policy variables, which is done in essay two, and 2) estimate the social rate of return
to government and private R& D , which is pursued in essay three. We focus on private
R & D in the second essay because we believe it is an important component of R & D in
decentralized market economies and is sensitive to changes in various fiscal
incentives. Our interest in fiscal policy comes from the fact that it is one of the most
commonly used policies to stimulate private R & D especially through tax credits,
allowances, and subsidies. This is particularly relevant since the market system tends

2
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to underinvest in R & D because of non-excludability associated with the creation of
new technology and knowledge, as argued by Lenjosek and Mansour (1999) and
Jones and W illiams (1998), among others.
Empirical results show that the effect of profit taxes on business R& D
investment could be positive because of R& D tax credits. The intuition is that
incremental R & D tax credit in the presence of significant tax burden on firms' profits
can be effective in inducing private firms to increase their R&D. Also, it is seen that
budget deficits crowd out business R & D and government capital expenditure has a
positive and significant effect of on business R & D while government consumption
expenditure is found to be insignificant.
We focus on government R & D in the third essay in order to examine the
validity of the commonly held hypothesis that the effect of government R & D on
economic growth is either zero or negative1. We disaggregate government R & D into
civil and defense R & D to test this hypothesis. Although the third essay deals with
high-income OECD countries, we think that studying the relationship between
government R & D and economic growth is also important to policymakers in
developing countries since almost all R& D activities in those countries are funded by
the government.
Results from a dynamic panel data model show that government R & D has a
positive and significant effect on GDP per capita growth which is contrary to most
empirical studies that report insignificant social rate of return to total government

1For more details see Griliches (1980), Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991), Battelsman (1990), and
Lichtenberg (1992).

3
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R&D. Furthermore, disaggregating civil government R & D shows that both civil
government R & D for economic development programs and for general university
funds have positive and significant effects on economic growth. C ivil government
R & D for health and environment programs is found to be insignificant, which is
expected since such programs produce services that most likely do not immediately
appear in the GDP. However, defense R & D is found to have either insignificant or
negative effect on economic growth, which supports the crowding out hypothesis
associated with defense R&D. In the short run, due to limited resources, if more is
devoted to defense R& D , less is available for civil government R & D and this might
have a negative impact on economic growth.

4
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ESSAY 1
D ETER M INA NTS OF AGGREGATE R & D EXPENDITURE IN DEVELOPED
A N D EM ERG ING COUNTRIES: A SEM IPARAM ETRIC PANEL D A TA STU D Y

Introdution
Research and development expenditure and its relationship with productivity
and economic growth have received much attention during the last three decades.
Griliches (1979), (1980), (1990) Romer (1990), and Grossman and Helpman (1991)
suggest that R & D expenditure is an important source of economic growth. It is well
known that the majority of the existing R&D-based growth literature concentrates on
the relationship between R& D and economic growth in developed countries,
specifically U.S.A, Canada, Japan, and other developed OECD countries.
This paper is one of the few attempts to study the determinants of R& D
expenditure in emerging countries and developed countries with special attention to
the effect of patent rights protection and technology transfer. In addition, this paper
also improves upon the existing literature by using a semiparametric panel data
framework. The existing empirical literature uses mostly linear cross section
regression. However, it is well known that a misspecification of the functional form
can lead to misleading conclusions. The semiparametric model takes care of the
misspecification bias problem and helps us understand the underlying dynamics of the
effect of different macro variables on R & D expenditure. Country and time specific
heterogeneities are also addressed by using a fixed effect panel data model.
We are particularly interested in the following questions: whether 1) patent
protection helps R& D , and 2) technology transfer takes place via trade in intermediate

5
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goods and FD I. We find that: 1) patent protection has a positive effect on R & D but
overly burdensome protection can lim it access to new innovations and thus slowdown
the rate of research and development, and 2) the effect of technology transfer on
domestic rate of R & D appears only in countries that depend heavily on imports of
intermediate goods and FD I. Although the existing R& D literature emphasizes the
importance of patent protection and technology transfer as determinants of R& D , this
essay contributes to the literature by extending the quality ladder model to incorporate
patent rights and their effects on R&D. The model then suggests and the empirics
confirm the presence of a threshold in patent protection beyond which the effect on
R& D weakens. And the semiparametric approach neatly captures the underlying
dynamic effects of different macro variables on R& D. In addition, contrary to
Lichtenberg's (2001) findings that only outward F D I flows and trade in intermediate
goods affect domestic R& D , we find a threshold after which inward F D I flows and
imports of intermediate goods affect domestic R&D.
The sample size is twenty-one countries which are divided into two groups:
the first contains six low and medium-income countries that have some record of
R & D expenditure2; the second group contains fifteen high-income OECD countries.
The paper focuses mainly on the macroeconomic determinants of R & D expenditure;
therefore, the empirical model contains country level annual data over the last two
decades.

2 Due to data constrains, the low and medium-income group contains only six countries over the period
1981-1997.

6
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In the next section we briefly discuss the relevant R & D literature. In section 3
we extend the quality ladder model of Grossman and Helpman (1991) to examine the
effects of patent protection on R&D. Also, a simple model of innovation and
imitation is presented to describe technology transfer. Section 4 presents the
empirical model and the results. The model is estimated in different ways in order to
compare between the parametric and semiparametric results. Section 5 contains the
conclusion.

Literature Review
In the following few paragraphs, the key studies on research and development
w ill be cited along with the core findings.

Studies on R & D in Developing Countries
-Lederman and Maloney (2003)
- Social rate of return to R & D in developing countries is around 78% and it decreases
with development. In addition, they conclude that financial depth, protection of
intellectual property rights, government capacity to mobilize resources, and the
quality of research institutions are the main reasons why R & D effort rises with the
level of development.
-Bebczuk (2002)
-Trade openness and investment in physical capital have a negative effect on
aggregate R & D expenditure in developing countries.

7
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Studies on International R & D Spillover
-Clemenz (1990)
Moving from Autarky to free trade stimulates R & D if the technological gap between
the international competitors is sufficiently small while a temporary protection is
favorable if the gap is large.
-Elj (2000)
Productivity level is positively related to its own cumulative R& D and also to other
industries’ technology investments due to trade in embodied technology. However,
domestic spillovers are stronger than the foreign ones for all sectors and all countries.
-Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997)
Developing countries can boost their productivity by importing a larger variety of
intermediate goods and capital equipments embodying foreign knowledge and by
acquiring useful information that would otherwise be costly to obtain.
-Potterie and Lichtenberg (2001)
Outward F D I flows and import flows are two simultaneous channels through which
technology spills over and benefits other industrialized countries.
-Coe and Helpman (1995)
Foreign R & D , defined as the import-share-weighted average of domestic R & D of
trade partners, has beneficial effects on domestic total factor productivity. These
effects are stronger the more open an economy is to international trade.

8
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Studies on Innovation and Imitation
-Perez-Sebastian (1999)
Technology imitation provides an additional growth engine that allows for rapid
convergence along with interest rates, consumption, and physical capital investment
shares.
-Eger, Kraft, and Weise (1991)
In a game-theoretic model of N identical players who are all engaged in a supergame
and have to choose between two strategies, innovation and imitation, an equilibrium
between innovation and imitation exists and is globally stable. However, equilibrium
is not Pareto-efficient.
-Mukoyama (2003)
Imitation enhances innovative activity by increasing the number of innovative
industries. He suggests that a subsidy to imitation might be preferable to a subsidy to
innovation because the later might increase the monopoly distortion.
-Papageorgiou (2003)
Developing economies possessing sufficiently high levels of skilled labor can take
advantage of existing technologies through imitation and grow rapidly for a long time.
-W ilke and Zaichkowsky (1999)
High-quality imitators are not a problem to society and may even benefit the
marketplace by providing good competition and more choices for consumers.

9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

-Zeng(2001)
A subsidy to innovation always speeds up economic growth while a subsidy to
imitation always does the opposite. The subsidy to imitation decreases the marginal
cost of the imitator and thus induces more employment in imitation which leads to a
reduction in the marginal benefits to innovation.
-Katz and Shapiro (1987)
The firm with the higher baseline profits, the industry leader, w ill tend to develop
major innovations if and only if imitation is difficult. They also suggest that a
decrease in the transaction cost of licensing that raises the innovator’s profits may
lead to slower development by reducing the incentives of the losing firm to fight for
the initial property rights.

Studies on Government and Private R& D
-David, Hall, and Toole (1999)
An empirical survey paper that addresses if public R & D is a complement or a
substitute for private R&D. They find that one third of the cases report that public
R & D behaves as a substitute for private R& D , the others find that complementarity
appears more prevalent at the industry and national economy levels.
-Goolsbee (1998)
Government R & D policy mainly benefit scientists and engineers in the U.S. A
significant fraction of the increased R & D spending goes directly into higher wages to
R& D scientists (because of the inelastic labor supply for these scientists).

10
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-Hu (2000)
There is significant complementarity between private and government R & D in
China’s enterprises.
-Tranjtenberg (2000)
Argues that government policy in Israel should be aimed at the supply side of R & D
(scientists and engineers) rather than subsidizing the demand side.

The Theoretical Model
The theoretical model in this paper extends Grossman and Helpman’s (1991)
quality ladder model. Generally, we focus on two main determinants of R&D: patent
rights protection laws and technology transfer. Assume two countries, A and B, where
A is a developed country and B is an emerging country; each country has three
sectors: traditional goods (Z), R& D (y), and intermediate goods (X). Household
demand is divided between the traditional good Z and the high-tech good Y which
uses X intermediate good in its production. Each sector uses two inputs: human
capital (H ) and unskilled labor (L).
The utility function of a representative household takes the form

Ut=°°je~p[a lo g Cy(t)+(1- a) log Cz(t) d t,

0 < a < l.

(1)

t

Where C, is the consumption of good i (i=Y, Z), p is the subjective discount
rate, a is fraction of consumer spending devoted to good Y - the high-tech product,
and the remaining 1- cr is devoted to good Z, the traditional good. It is well known that
the solution to this problem involves

11
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(2)

E /E = r - p

Where E is the aggregate expenditure in the economy and E(t)=ptCi. p t is the
price of good i, and r is the interest rate. In the steady-state
(3)

r= p

W e also normalize expenditure so that
E(t )= 1

W ith the normalization of aggregate spending, E (t)= l, demand for good Y
equals a/pY, and equals 1- a/pz for good Z. In equilibrium the value of household
purchases of good Y equals the aggregate cost of component intermediates pxX.
Therefore, the market clearing condition for the high tech product implies that
pxX = a

(4)

And the market clearing condition for the traditional good Z implies that
(5)

P z Z = 1 -< j

In the oligopoly equilibrium for product X, it is assumed that the industry
leader captures the entire world market by setting a price that is X times the unit cost
of production of its closest competitor on the quality ladder. That is
Px

= X C(x)

(6)

Where X >1 and is an index of quality increments. One explanation is that
each new generation of product provides X times as many services as the product of
the generation before it. This means that technological progress causes costs in that
product line to fall by a factor of 1/X. The expected stream of profits for each firm
engaging in R & D activity is

12
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7T = x(px-C(x))

(7)

Substituting (4) and (6) in (7) we get

a
px
7T= — (px - ) ,
Px

A

which reduces to
(8)

n = ( l - 1/X) a

Now relating the profit from R& D with the total cost of R& D , (C (y)), the
long-run profit rate is —— ^

_This profit rate declines with the rate of innovation

c(r)
because as y increases the cost of R & D increases too. In equilibrium, the profit rate
equals the cost of capital (r) and the risk of capital loss which is given by the rate of
innovation (y), because a successful innovation can replace the current market leader.
The market clearing condition takes the form
[(l-l//t)< 7 ]

c(r)

(9)

■= p + y
Figure 1
The Equilibrium Rate of Innovation

n,R
n

R

y (the rate of innovation)

13
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As shown in Figure 1, n n presents the profit rate and RR presents the required
return, given by the safe asset return and the risk of capital loss. The RR curve is
upward sloping since the risk rises with the rate of innovation because a successful
innovation unseats the current leader which happens with probability y. The
equilibrium rate of innovation is shown at point A.

Patent Rights Protection and the Rate of R&D
We next model patent rights in the R& D race. As indicated in Park and Wagh
(2000), the strength of intellectual property and patent rights in a country is based
upon five criteria:(l) coverage (the subject matter that can be patented); (2) duration
(the length of protection); (3) enforcement (the mechanisms for enforcing patent
rights); (4) membership in international patent treaties; and (5) restrictions or
limitations on the use of patent rights. Our hypothesis is that the rate of R & D is
positively related with the strength of intellectual property and patent rights. Let 8 be
an index of the strength of intellectual property and patent rights, where 0 < 8< 1 .
Using an asset value equation the value of a firm engaging in R & D is determined as

(10)

n + V - V(y+1- 8) = pV,

where tt is the profit flow, V is the capital gains, (y+1- 8) is the risk of capital loss,
and p is the return on alternative investment in the safe asset. The risk term (y+1- 8)
includes both innovation and the lack of patent protection because with probability
(y+1- 8) the existing leader is replaced.

14
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In the steady-state where V =0, the market value of the firm is
d o

( p + r + i - 0)
Or
1

V (A )

n(/1)

( 12)

(p + y + 1-6)

We explicitly write V(X) to examine the effect of A on profit, market value,
and innovation. The basic idea is that a firm that makes quality improvements enjoys
a higher market value. From equation (12) we can see that as 6 increases, the right
hand side (the discount factor) increases and thus the left hand side should also
increase provided that V(X) rises more than n(X). This means that X rises with 0 if the
effect of quality improvements on the market value of the firm is greater than its
effect on the profit flow, which is intuitive and ought to be naturally satisfied. We
show next that this occurs when there is an increase in the degree of patent protection,

e.
We write equation (11) in elasticity form following a change in 0,
£ V ,A £ X ,0 ~

£ tc ,X £ x ,0

(13)

£ d ,6 >

where d = --------- ---------- is the discount factor.

(p + y + l - 0 )

Becauseed 0 is positive it follows thatevX > enk, which means that the value
of the firm responds to an increase in 8 by more than the profit flow. The basic
intuition for our result is that an increase in patent protection enables firms to make a

15
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bigger commitment in their R& D race, which takes the form of quality improvements.
In terms of the determinants of innovation, the profit rate curve n il shifts up in
response to the increase in patent protection which raises the profit flow while the RR
line shifts down due to a decrease in the risk associated with R&D.
A factor that is likely to affect the cost of innovation, particularly at high
levels of patent protection, is that overly burdensome protection can lim it access to
new ideas and slowdown innovation. This would have the effect of raising the cost of
innovation. We incorporate this factor in the steady state equation as

n(<A)a

c(r,e-d.)

= p + y+1-

e ,

(14)

where 0Ois a threshold after which the R & D cost function rises with 6, i.e.,
C$>0 for

6>6o,

and C#=0 for 0<9o. This would slow the profit rate for 0>d o, leading

to a slowdown in the rate of innovation. O f course, at very high levels of 6, it is
possible that the gains in profit are entirely offset by rising costs and the n n curve
does not shift. A perverse effect is possible in which case the n n curve shifts in,
which would have a negative effect on the rate of innovation.

Foreign R & D and Technology Transfer
The effect of foreign R & D on domestic R & D and the way technology is
transmitted between countries have received much attention. W ell known examples
are Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997), Coe and Helpman (1995), Bebczuk
(2002), Moez El Elj (2000), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Potterie and
Lichtenberg (2001), to mention a few. The general consensus is that the important
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technology transmission mechanisms are through trade and FD I, especially trade in
intermediate goods and outward FD I flows.
In this paper we postulate that trade in intermediate goods and FD I increase
the rate of innovation in both exporting and importing countries. Let us consider a
situation in which we have two countries, an LDC and a developed country. We
assume that the LDC only imitates and the developed country only innovates. We are
assuming also in this model that the imitation rate in the LDC is strictly less than the
innovation rate in the developed country, because imitation is derived from
innovation. That is I<y, where I is the imitation rate in the LDC. Using asset value
equations and ignoring patent protection issues we can state that the value of an
innovating firm in the developed country, V0, is given by

(15)

7^+ V D - V °(y + I) = PDV °

where /, the imitation rate in the LDC, increases the risk of displacement of
the leading firm in the developed country. Thus, in the steady state

VD=— — —
p +y+I

(16)

We assume that the risk facing an imitating firm is given by the rate of
innovation but does not depend on imitation. This can be rationalized by assuming
that successful imitation occurs only once for every new technology. So the risk to a
successful firm in the LDC is just the rate of innovation in the developed country.
The market value for the imitator firm, V1, is given by

(17)

n h + V L- V L(y) = p LV L
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And

VL=

(IB )

Y+ p

It follows that in the steady state the rate of innovation cannot be decreasing in
the rate of imitation. If it did, both innovation and imitation would be zero because
imitation is derived from innovation. In this simple model of imitation, therefore, we
expect that y'(I)>0. The transmission mechanism that enables the LDC to imitate, we
assume, is increasing in imports of intermediate goods and FD I. From this argument it
follows that imports of intermediate goods and FD I help imitation, which in turn
raises innovation and thus R & D in both countries.

Empirical Application
This paper uses a semiparametric approach to estimate the determinants of
R &D. It is well known that misspecification of the functional form can lead to biased
econometric estimates, resulting in misleading conclusions about hypothesis testing.
In this respect the nonparametric approach, which does not impose any restriction on
the functional form of the regression model, has been increasingly popular in
econometrics during the last decade or so. However, the major complication in a
purely nonparametric econometric approach is that of the “curse of dimensionality”.
Every econometric technique has some detriment associated with it and in case of
nonparametric, it is the need for a very large sample size without which accuracy is
not possible. Also the size of the sample required increases with the increase in the
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number of regressors involved in the model. It is in this regard that the
semiparametric approach has been very popular.
In a semiparametric analysis one can impose linear functional form for some
of the regressors whereas the other (smaller number of) regressors may be allowed to
have an unknown functional form. Effectively, the semiparametric estimation
involves the use of a combination of parametric and nonparametric techniques within
the same regression model. Cross sectional nonparametric and semiparametric
regression analysis can be found in Robinson (1988), Hardle (1990), Pagan and Ullah
(1999). Panel data with fixed and random effects in nonparametric and
semiparametric frameworks have been discussed in Porter (1991), Li and Ullah
(1998), Ullah and Roy (1998).
This paper attempts to apply semiparmetric panel data techniques to test the
aforementioned hypotheses about the determinants of research and development
expenditure. Both country and time specific heterogeneity effects are captured in the
model. Moreover semiparametric estimation involves local point wise analysis and
helps us find the underlying dynamics of the effect of different macroeconomic
determinants of R&D.

Econometric Model
W e use a fixed effect semiparametric regression model as in (19). The
methodology used is very similar to that in Ullah and Roy (1998). Ullah & Roy
(1998) has only individual specific fixed effect in their model. This paper follows the
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same methodology but incorporates time specific fixed effect in addition. The model
is
yu = «, + /u, + fa x + m(zit)+uit
i - 1 , ...........,n, and t = l ,

(19)
,T

Where yu is the dependent variable of individual i in time t, o.i is the individualspecific fixed effect parameter, fj., is the time-specific fixed effect parameter, xit is a
vector of linear parametric regressors, zu is a vector of regressors with the known
functional form, m(.) represents the unknown functional form, and w,/s are assumed
to be i.i.d with mean zero and constant variance a2. The identification conditions are
ft

T

= Oand ] T // f = 0

i=1

t=1

If

m (Z it)=

Pzu, we get the linear parametric model. Taking a linear

approximation of m(zu) around a fixed point z we have,
(20)

m(zit)= m(z)+S(z)(Zit-z)

Where d(z) is the first derivative of m(zu) at zu=z
Thus, substituting (20) in (19) we get,
yu = a-, + jut + feu + m(z)+S(z)(zit-z)+uu

(21)

This is the local linear semiparametric model.
Following Robinson’s method (1988), both f3 and d can be estimated as follows

P = Z i Xr ( y*it x *it) / Z i ILt

(22)

Where
y*it= yu - E(yit I Zit)) and,
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x *it= x u - E(xu I Zit)

And thus,
(23)

y * it= P x * u

To get an estimation of the nonparametric part of equation (21), we subtract (23) from
(21) to get
y * *it= at

+ Ji + m(z)+d(z)(Zu-z)+f*u

(24)

And

S (z)=

^

Y j [ ( zu - Z i.-z.t + z ) ( y * * u - y * \ - y * * t + y * * K ( Zu
1=1

(= i

X

t

t=i

(= i

z ))]/
"•

(Zit-Zi.-z.t + ~

z

f

K

(

(25)

"■

where zi. is the average of zn over time, z.t is the average of zu over individuals, z
is the average over all observations, K(.) is the kernel smoothing function, and h is
the bandwidth.

Data
The sample of study contains six low and medium-income countries: India,
Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, and Venezuela, and 15 high-income OECD
countries: Austria, Denmark, Canada, Finland, France, Japan, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA. Data are collected
from several sources: W orld Bank W D I, UNESCO website, Science & Technology
Ibero-American Indicators Network website (R IC YT). W e used the patent rights
index constructed by Walter G. Park and Smita Wagh (2000) that represents the
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strength of the patents rights laws in each country of interest. The index range is from
1 to 5; the closer the index to 5 the stronger are the patent rights laws in the country.
The panel data contains an annual country level data over 17 years (1981-1997).
The variables considered are: aggregate R & D expenditure as a percent of
GDP, patent rights (Pat), budget deficit as a percent of GDP (Bd), manufactured
imports as a percent of GDP (Imp), foreign direct investment inflows (FD I), and log
of real GDP per capita (LRGDP). The other control variables are: inflation (Inf), and
secondary school enrolment as a percent of population (SE) as a proxy of human
capital. FD I and manufactured imports as a percent of GDP are used to represent the
prospect of technology transfer from foreign R&D. We could not find data on
government subsidies to domestic R& D over our period of study especially in the low
and medium-income countries, so we w ill study only the effect of budget deficit on
the rate of R & D knowing that this deficit is not necessarily caused by an R & D
subsidy. Table 1 contains the statistical description of the variables.

Table 1
Statistical Description
Variables
Mean
St. Deviation
Max.
M in.

R&D
1.47
0.87
3.89
0.07

LRGDP
9.3
1.3

10.68
5.46

IM P
15.5
7.39
37.54
1.96

FD I
0.97

1.01
6.45
-0.85

BD
-3.5
3.89
5.08
-16

SE
87.2
28.7
142.8
1.97

Inf
9.35
16.24
139.6
-1.44

Pat
3

1.1
4.8
0.3

Results
We first estimated the whole sample in a fixed effect parametric framework.
The choice of a fixed effect model is based on Hausman test. The results of the
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parametric model are presented in the second column in Table 2. The second
estimation is conducted using the semiparametric model3. Tests for linearity suggest
that there is a nonlinear relation between R & D and all the variables of interest
(patents, imports, GDP per-capita, FD I, budget deficit) and thus, the linear parametric
model w ill not be appropriate. However, it is difficult to use nonparametric functional
form for all those variables together in a regression model as it may lead to
“dimensionality” problem.
Table 2
Parametric and Nonparametric Results
Variables

Parametric
Results

Pat

0.286
(6.332)
0.761
(7.677)
-0.031
(-5.545)
0.035
(2.167)
- 0.010
(-2.531)

LRGDP
Imp
FD I
Bd
SE
Inf

0.001
(1.577)
-0.003
(-4.011)
0.94

Nonlin
earity in
Pat.
0.692
(22 .222)
0.208
(4.267)
-0.029
(-6.216)
0.037
(1.219)
0.007
(0.976)
0.007
(4.064)
-0.007
(-3.860)
0.97

Nonlin
earity in
LRGDP
0.317
(6.619)
0.738
(33.7)
-0.026
(-5.874)
0.083
(2.703)

0.002
(0.370)
0.003
(1.867)
-0.005
(-2.462)
0.98

Nonlin
earity in
Imp.
0.317
(6.751)
0.1845
(4.160)

0.001
(0.251)
0.088
(2.908)
-0.003
(-0.515)
0.004
(2.15)
-0.006
(-3.365)
0.94

Nonlin
earity
In FD I
0.289
(6.281)
0.147
(3.378)
-0.032
(-7.186)
-0.004
(-0.232)

0.010
(1.393)
0.007
(3.811)
-0.007
(-3.735)
0.94

R2
Notes:
- R & D expenditure as a percent of GDP is the dependent variable.
- The total number of observations (n*T) is 357.
- t-statistic is in the parentheses.

Nonlin
earity in
Bd.
0.297
(6.483)
0.159
(3.583)
-0.032
(-7.319)
0.052
(1.683)
-0.036
(-7.199)
0.006
(3.248)
-0.008
(-4.405)
0.96

1Standard normal kernel and optimal bandwidth that minimizes the mean square error have been used.
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Thus, we consider different semiparametric models while focusing on
different economic hypotheses regarding the determinants of R&D. For example,
while focusing on the hypothesis about the effect of patent on R& D , we consider a
semiparametric model with patent {zu), being the only regressor with unknown
function form m(.) and all other variables, inflation, imports, GDP, FD I, school
enrolment, budget deficit (xu) are assumed to have a linear form. Thus, we consider
five different semiparametric regression models. The results are reported in columns 3
to 7 in Table 2 while the results for the linear parametric estimation are reported in
column 2 .
Figure 2
The Effect of Patent Rights on the Rate of R&D
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Column 3 reports the result for semiparametric regression where the unknown
functional form is assumed for patent rights index only. Since the
nonparametric/semiparametric estimation is a local “point-wise” analysis, the
obtained slope coefficients vary with the regressors as in any typical nonlinear
regression model. Based on the sample size, we obtained 357 slope coefficients. The
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averages of those coefficients are reported in Table 2 as the estimated coefficient for
the effect of patent rights on R& D expenditure. However, in Figure 2 we present the
dynamics of the effect of patent on R&D. In the horizontal axis we measure the index
of patents whereas in the vertical axis we measure the effect of patent rights index on
R & D expenditure, i.e., the estimated slope coefficients (8(z) in equation 25).
Figure 3
The Effect of GDP/Capita on the Rate of R & D
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A 5% confidence bandfor the slope coefficient S(z) is also presented. We
found that the effect of patent rights on R & D is positive and significant for all values
of patents. However, the positive effect slows down after a threshold of 3.5. That is,
beyond this level if the government increases the patent rights protection, the
percentage of R & D expenditure increases but at a decreasing rate. This means that too
much protection may cause a slowing down in the rate of R&D because now
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accessing the technology is very costly. Patent rights index is also found to be positive
and significant in the parametric estimations (column 2).
Figure 4
The Effect of Budget Deficit on the Rate of R & D
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Column 4 reports the effect of GDP per-capita on the rate of R&D. The
positive and significant effect indicates that richer countries are able to support a
higher rate of innovation. As for the dynamics, the semiparametric estimators are
presented in Figure 3. It shows that there are two thresholds in the relationship
between GDP per-capita and the rate of R&D, the first one is when GDP per-capita
reaches a level of 7.2 ($2900). After this level we find that the positive effect of the
GDP per-capita is increasing at an increasing rate until it reaches the second threshold
(8.5 which is about $4600). We then find the effect of GDP per-capita on the rate of
R& D becomes weaker but still positive.
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The average of the coefficients of budget deficit is reported in column 7. The
nonparametric estimation shows a negative and significant impact of budget deficit on
the rate of R&D. Imports and FD I nonparametric coefficients appears in columns 5
and 6 respectively. The average coefficients are insignificant for both proxies of
foreign R& D . Coefficients for the parametric regression are significant and negative
for both the cases.
Figure 5
The Effect of Imports on the Rate of R&D
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However, when we look at the dynamics in Figures 5 and 6 we find that both
variables turn out to be significant and positive after a certain threshold (30% of GDP
in case o f imports and 3% o f GDP in case o f FD I) is reached. This means that foreign
technology has an effect on domestic R & D only when the country depends heavily on
importing intermediate goods or inward FD I flows.
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Figure 6
The Effect of F D I on the Rate of R&D
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School enrollment, that has been estimated parametrically, has the expected
positive sign and its effect on the rate of R& D is significant. Inflation has also been
estimated parametrically and has a negative and significant effect on the research and
development expenditure

Conclusion
In this paper we analyze some R & D determinants using a theoretical model
and a panel data semiparametric empirical model that uses country level data of
twenty-one countries, of which six are emerging, for the period 1981-1997. The
theoretical model predicts that patent protection and technology transfer have positive
effects on the rate of innovation. However, the effect of patent protection slows down
after a certain threshold in the degree of patent protection is reached. It also predicts
that technology transfers through imports of intermediate goods and FD I inflows raise
the rate of innovation and imitation in both developed and less developed countries.
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The dynamics of the semiparametric model capture these predictions well. We
find that patent protection’s effect on the rate of R& D becomes weaker, though still
positive, after it reaches an index of 3.5. In addition, imports and F D I effects are
positive and significant but only for countries that depend heavily on F D I and
imported intermediate goods. GDP per-capita is found to have a positive effect on the
rate of R & D but becomes weaker after a threshold is reached, while the effect of
budget deficit is found to be negative and significant. Other control variables such as
inflation and school enrolment are found to have the expected impact on research and
development expenditure (negative effect for inflation and positive effect for school
enrolment).
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ESSAY 2
FISCAL PO LICY A N D BUSINESS EXPENDITU RE ON R&D: A N EM PIR IC A L
STUDY OF OECD COUNTRIES

Introduction
Private expenditure on research and development has received a lot of
attention by both researchers and policymakers since it plays a vital role in increasing
economic growth and productivity. For example, Lichtenberg (1992) finds that
privately funded R & D investment has a significant positive effect on both the level
and growth rate of productivity. A similar result is found by Albert Hu (2000) and
Jones and W illiams (1998). These results motivate governments to design economic
policies so that they can stimulate private R&D. In OECD countries, Dominique
Guellec and Bruno Van Pottelsberghe (2000) show that governments implement
several policies to support business sector R&D, which was the largest of three
sectors performing R & D in the past decade in most OECD countries; the other two
being higher education and government R&D. Governments support was provided
either directly by funding businesses for carrying out certain research, or indirectly by
providing fiscal incentives.
In the R & D literature, several studies investigate the relationship between
Private R & D expenditure and fiscal policy incentives. Their purpose is to investigate
whether the fiscal incentives, specifically tax credits and allowances, can be welfare
enhancing by increasing the rate of R& D. In other words, they aim at comparing the
tax revenue loss arising from fiscal incentives and the social benefits arising from
increasing the private expenditure on R&D. Such studies have been undertaken by
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Edwin Mansfield (1986) and Mansfield et al (1985), Lenjosek and Mansour (1999),
Bloom, G riffith, and Reenen (2000), and Hall and Reneen (1999).
In this paper we conduct an empirical study of the effect of fiscal policy on
private R & D expenditure in OECD countries. The main idea in this paper is to treat
the research and development expenditure decision in the private sector as an
investment decision and examine how it is affected by various fiscal policy variables.
Following Barro (1990), we divide the fiscal policy variables into four categories:
distortionary taxes and non-distortionary taxes (the tax side), and productive and non
productive expenditure (the expenditure side).
Our main goal is to examine the impact of the first three fiscal variables,
along with budget deficit, on the private R & D investment decision assuming that
private firms are provided with R & D tax incentives. The later assumption is
important not only because it is a practical assumption (most developed economies
offer R & D tax incentives to private firms for qualified R & D expenditure), but also
because it helps us understand the behavior of private R & D investment for any
increase in the marginal income tax rate in the presence of R & D tax incentives. Non
productive expenditure, such as social security and any transfer payments, is ignored
in the analysis since it is expected that its impact on private R& D expenditure
decision is insignificant.
The empirical study is applied to a sample of 14 high-income OECD countries
over the period 1981-2000. Country and time specific heterogeneities are addressed
by using a fixed effect panel data model.
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In the next section we briefly discuss the relevant R & D literature. Section 3
contains the theoretical model in which we extend the quality ladder model of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) to examine the effects of different fiscal policy
variables on private R& D expenditure. Section 4 presents the empirical model, data,
and results. Section 5 contains the conclusion.

Literature Review
The field of fiscal policy and business expenditure on R & D has been a subject
for many theoretical and empirical studies. The most important of these studies are
listed below.
-Hines, JR. (1997)
Tax policies influence significantly the level, composition, and location of R&D
activity of US based multinational firms.
-Nadiri and Mamuneas (1997)
In US manufacturing industries, publicly financed R & D investment is more
appropriate for increasing efficiency and stimulating output growth whereas R & D tax
policy is more appropriate for stimulating private sector R& D investment.
-Conway (1997)
Suggests that an R & D tax deduction of 150 to 200 percent of R & D expenditure is an
appropriate incentive for private firms.
-Hussinger (2003)
By adopting parametric and semiparametric selection model in cross sectional firm
level data in Germany, Hussinger finds that public funding of R & D increases private
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firms’ R& D expenditure. So the hypothesis of crowding out between public and
private R & D funding is rejected.
-Lenjosek and Mansour (1999)
Their basic idea is that because technology and knowledge are characterized by both
non-excludability and non-rivalry, we expect that the market system w ill underinvest
in R& D. They conclude that R & D tax incentives are cost-effective if the ratio of
incremental R & D expenditures to tax revenue forgone is greater than or equal unity
and thus, R & D tax incentives w ill be welfare enhancing.
-Hall (1992)
During the eighties, R& D spending at the firm level in the US responds to the tax
credit incentive although it took several years for firms to fully adjust.
- Bloom, Griffith, and Reenen (2000)
They constructed an empirical model to test the effectiveness of R & D tax incentives
in nine OECD countries during the period 1979-1994. The main conclusion of this
study is that fiscal incentives matter because it has an effect on reducing the user cost
of R&D. In other words, tax changes significantly affect the level of R&D
-Mansfield (1986) and Mansfield et al (1985)
He studied the effectiveness of Canada’s direct tax incentives for R & D using data
from 55 firms. The econometric results show that the tax credit did increase R & D
expenditures, but with modest percentages (a one-dollar loss in government revenue
resulted in about 30 to 40 cents increase in company-financed R & D expenditure).
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- Howe and McFetridge (1976)
The main determinants of R & D expenditure are found to be current sales, cash flow,
and government incentive grants. Government R& D subsidies induced R & D
expenditure in only one of the three industries investigated (electrical, chemical, and
machinery industries).
-Peretto (2003)
The main point of this theoretical study of fiscal policy and long run growth in R & D based models is that the only fiscal instruments that have steady-state growth effects
are the tax on household asset income because it is a tax on saving, and the tax on
corporate income because it grants an implicit subsidy to R & D undertaken by
incumbents.
Some other studies were conducted on government and private R & D as follows:

-David, Hall, and Toole (1999)
A survey of econometric evidence over 35 years to figure out whether public R & D is
a complement or a substitute for private R&D. They find that one third of the cases
report that public R & D behaves as a substitute for private R&D.
-Goolsbee (1998)
Government R & D policy mainly benefit scientists and engineers in the U.S. A
significant fraction of the increased R & D spending goes directly into higher wages to
R& D scientists because of the inelastic labor supply for these scientists.
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-Hu (2000)
There is a significant complementary relationship between private and government
R & D in China’s enterprises.
-Tranjtenberg (2000)
Israel R & D policy should be aimed at the supply side of the R& D market (scientists
and engineers) rather than keeping subsidizing the demand side.
-Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2000).
Direct government funding of R& D and tax incentives have a positive effect on
business-financed R&D. However, direct government funding and R& D tax
incentives are substitutes: increased intensity of one reduces the effect of the other on
business R&D.

The Theoretical Model
In this paper, we extend Grossman and Helpman's (1991) quality ladder model
to examine the effects of fiscal policy variables on the rate of research and
development in the business sector. More specifically, we focus on four main fiscal
variables: taxes on income and profits (distortionary tax), taxes on expenditure (nondistortionary tax), government productive expenditure, and budget deficit or surplus.
Following Barro (1990) and Mendoza et al (1997), the relevant distortion here is that
the incentive to invest in physical and/ or human capital may be adversely affected.
Expenditure (consumption) taxes are non-distortionary in the sense that they do not
reduce the returns to invest; nevertheless, they may affect the returns to investment
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indirectly through the labor/education-leisure choice, which in turn affects the
capital/labor ratio in production.

Budget Deficit and the Rate of R& D
As mentioned in the first paper, the steady state market clearing condition in
the R&D sector states that the rate of innovation is determined by the equality

between the profit rate for a representative producer—— ^

c(y)

, which is represented

by n n curve in Figure 7, and the sum of the risk free rate (p) and the risk of capital
loss (y), which is represented by the RR curve.
That is:
(1 —1/ X ) G
-— T r — = p + y

(1)

c(y)

Where X is the quality index (/1>1), C(y) is the cost of R&D, and a is the
fraction of consumer spending devoted to the high-tech goods. We assume here that
each high-tech producing firm engages in R& D activity.
Let S reflect the government budget imbalance. In case of a budget deficit, S is
negative, and in case of budget surplus S is positive (S = 0 in case of a balanced
budget). Suppose that due to external effects, the government realizes a budget deficit
and it chooses to finance the deficit through borrowing. The expected “transitional”
effect of this policy is to change the interest rate r by an amount s, which would have
the opposite sign of S and increases with the absolute value of S. This would capture
the crowding out effect, for example, when 5<0. And because r(t) = p in our model,
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so the right hand side in equation ( 1) w ill increase and reflect the increase in the cost
of capital associated with budget deficit. The market clearing condition now is
( l- l/i) t r

= (p + s ) + y

(2)

c (r )

As s here is positive, it is clear that the RR curve w ill shift upward to R'R' and,
as a result, the rate of innovation goes down.
On the other hand, if the government realizes a budget surplus so that it can
redeem some of its debts, we expect a reduction in the interest rate. In this case RR
curve w ill shift downward reflecting an increase in the rate of innovation. The budget
imbalance index ( S) is positive in this case. It is obvious that if the government
realizes a balanced budget, the budget imbalance index (S) and the interest rate effect
are both zero, and thus, there w ill be no effect on the rate of innovation.
Figure 7
The Effect of Government Budget Deficit on the Rate of Innovation

n/R

y (rate of innovation)
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Income Taxes. Tax Credits, and the Rate of R & D
Although it is well known that taxes on income and profits have a negative
effect on private investment in general, their effect on R & D investment in the
business sector could be altered because of the existence of tax incentives to R & D 4.
Suppose that private firms are subjected to a profit tax rate t so that the net profit after
tax is (1-

t)tu t.

A s implemented in most tax systems in developed countries, suppose

that the government gives a tax credit to R & D investment which applies only to the
incremental investment in business R & D 5. This procedure creates more incentive for
firms to increase its R& D investment especially if they are suffering from high
marginal tax rates.
The direct effect of the tax credit, which is equivalent to a government
subsidy in the Grossman and Helpman model, is to reduce the user cost of R& D
investment. The effective after-tax credit cost of the incremental R & D is (1 where

tc

tc )c r ,

is the tax credit and cY is the cost of the incremental R & D investment ( c y -

c (A ^ )). Following Stiglitz (2000)6, firms w ill increase their investment in R&D
beyond previous year's level as long as the after-tax marginal return to R& D ,
((l-r)MRy), is greater than the after-tax credit cost of the incremental R& D . That is

(1 -f)MRy> (1 -

tc )C y

,

(3)

or

4 In their empirical paper, Easterly and Rebelo find that marginal income tax rate has a negative effect
on private investment.
5 Some countries, France for example, depend on the previous year's R&D as a base year; others take
an average of the R&D expenditure over the past two or three years, as in Spain and USA.
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MRy>~~z~~~
(1- r )

(4)

Assuming that we start with a situation in which the firm's before-tax marginal
return to R & D equals the before-tax credit marginal cost of R & D (MRy = cy), the
government has to design its fiscal policy so that it can achieve the inequality in
equation (4) and thus encourage firms to increase R & D investment. This could be
done by setting tc> t (it is clear that if tc=r, this fiscal policy leaves R & D investment
unaffected since the marginal return is reduced by the same amount that marginal cost
is). The government needs to keep this inequality as long as the social benefits from
R & D are greater than the private benefits7.We must note here that the marginal tax
rate on profits (t) is bounded between zero and 1, while the tax credit can be
unbounded. This means that the tax credit could reach 100% of the incremental R & D
o

investment or it may exceed that lim it.
In any typical year firms can maximize their benefits from the tax credit and
avoid paying profit taxes by increasing R & D investment. And as long as the R & D tax
credit does not exceed the firm's tax liability, we expect that increasing the marginal
tax rate on profits together with the provision of the incremental R & D tax credit, but

6 Stiglitz shows how the investment decision is undertaken when taxes affect both the cost of capital, in
the presence of tax incentives, and its return. For more information, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Economics
of the Public Sector", 3rd edition, W.W. Norton and Company, 2000, pp 584-585.
7 Studies of social return to R&D such as Griliches and Lichenberg (1984), Griliches (1994), and Jones
and Williams (1998) find large rate of returns to R&D, suggesting substantial underinvestment in R&D.
The later study estimates the optimal investment in R&D is more than two to four times the actual
investment in R&D.
g
In this case, R&D tax credit will be more effective if it is accompanied by R&D tax credit carryback
or carryforward as applied in some OECD countries such as Australia, Belgium, Denmark,
Netherlands, and Spain. In such countries, the carryback period is usually between 3 to 5 years while
the carryforward period could be up to 10 years. For more information see: Bronwyn Hall and Van
Reenen (1999).

39

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

keeping tc>r, is an effective fiscal policy that leads to an increase in R & D investment.
This works because firms find that an effective way to reduce the incremental tax
burden is to increase R & D investment. Also, the mix of tax and credit helps
government to balance its budget.
R & D tax credit is one of the most commonly used fiscal incentives along with
depreciation allowances in developed countries to encourage firms to undertake more
R& D. Nevertheless, some studies, Mansfield (1986) and Mansfield et al (1985) for
example, find that R & D tax credits are not welfare enhancing because the loss in tax
revenue associated with the tax credit is greater than the increase in R & D
expenditure. As Mansfield (1986) indicated in his paper, firms may claim some of
their expenditure as R & D to benefit from the tax incentives offered to them while in
fact these expenditures are not really what informed observers would regard as R& D
expenditure. This is mainly because of the vagueness of R& D definition in the tax
law.

Expenditure Taxes. Government Expenditure, and the Rate of R & D
It is well known that in practice consumption (sales) taxes are levied only on the
consumption of goods-such as capital goods and consumer durables- and not in such a
way to conform to a comprehensive consumption tax base. We assume here that the
consumption tax is levied on consumers' purchases o f high-tech goods. This tax is
expected to have a direct effect on o (the fraction of consumer spending devoted to
the high-tech goods). The steady-state market clearing condition w ill be
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{ \ - \ l X )o (\-£ t)

TV

c(y)

(5)

- = P + r

Where t is the tax rate, 0 < t < l and e is the price elasticity of demand, e<0. The
consumption tax w ill reduce the fraction of consumer spending devoted to high-tech
goods as long as # 0 and thus the expected stream of profits for each firm engaging in
R & D activity w ill be reduced. The negative effect of the consumption tax w ill shift
the

fin curve down to IT IT which means that the rate of innovation decreases with

the imposition of consumption taxes. This negative effect is expected to be large if we
assumed that high-tech products are luxury goods and thus we expect that the price
elasticity of demand on these products is high. Figure 8 represents this result.
The effect of government expenditure on private R & D is somewhat
ambiguous. Peretto (2003) argues that a rise in the fraction of tax revenues allocated
to productive expenditure, which employ labor, has a negative effect on the fraction
of the labor force allocated to R & D in private firms; i. e., public employment
displaces private employment. His basic idea is that the rise in public employment
crowds out firms and thereby lowers the number of firms per capita which, in turn,
has two contradictory effects: the first is that the typical firm, which survives in the
market, has a larger market share and thus realizes more profits, the second is that,
assuming R & D spending per firm does not change, since the rate of return on firms'
stocks rises, households are induced to reduce consumption expenditure and increase
assets holding. This reduction in expenditure leads to a reduction in firms' revenues.
Relating Peretto's argument to our model, we can say that the negative effect
of government productive expenditure on the fraction of labor force allocated to R & D
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is reflected in an increase in C(y): as labor available in the private sector is now
relatively scarce the cost of R& D tends to rise. In addition, the market size variable
for the typical firm, a, is affected positively because there are likely to be fewer firms,
while the reduction in consumption expenditure has a negative effect; thus the net
effect of government productive expenditure on R & D is ambiguous9. The empirical
model in the next section helps us find out whether government productive
expenditure and business R& D are complements or substitutes.
Figure 8
The Effect of a Consumption Tax on High-tech Products on the Rate of
Innovation

Il/R

n

R
y (rate of innovation)

9 Peretto argues that if the government allocates all tax revenues to transfer payments, there is no
crowding out through the labor supply and consumption expenditure and the number of firms might
rise.
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The Empirical Model
We apply the fixed effect two stage least squares model to estimate the
relationship between fiscal policy variables and business R & D investment in 14 highincome OECD countries over the period 1981-2000. The choice of a fixed effect
model is based on Wald test. We apply the two stage least squares method to
overcome the problem of endogeneity between business and government R & D 10.
However, we also report the OLS results to compare between the two methods.
Country specific heterogeneity effects are captured in the model. The empirical model
consists of two simultaneous equations: the main equation of interest is the business
R & D equation; the second equation is the government R & D equation. In addition,
these two structural equations explore the interrelationship between business and
government R & D in the OECD countries in question. We use the explanatory
variables with lagged values as instruments.
The econometric model is specified as follows:
The business R & D equation
BERD= oci + fixa + Sz.it + E u,

(5)

t = ( l , ............,20) and i = ( l , ............ ,14)

Where BERD is business expenditure on research and development, x is a
vector of fiscal policy variables, z is a vector of control variables, a, is the individual

10 We tested for endogeneity of government R&D using Hausman auxiliary regression test as presented
by Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) and find that it does exist which means that OLS estimation is not
consistent.
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specific fixed effect parameter, and e ,/s are assumed to be i.i.d with mean zero and
n

constant variance (?. The identification condition is

os = 0.
;=i

The government R & D equation

GERD—0l + dfu + ok.it + fi it,

(6)

t = ( l , ............,20) and i = ( l , ............ ,14)

Where GERD is government expenditure on research and development,/is a
vector of fiscal policy variables, £ is a vector of control variables, 0 is the individualspecific fixed effect parameter, andn ,/s are assumed to be i.i.d with mean zero and
n

constant variance a2. The identification condition is ^ (fx = 0 . We must note that the
i=1

fiscal policy variables and the control variables in equations (5) and (6) are not the
same. The next section describes these variables.

Data
The sample of study contains 14 high-income OECD countries: Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, and USA.
Data are collected from several sources: W orld Bank W D I and International
Financial Statistics (IFS) are the main sources for the control variables and some of
the fiscal policy variables listed below whereas OECD database is the main source for
business R & D expenditure. Government Financial Statistics is used for some of the
fiscal policy variables. We used the patent rights index constructed by Walter G. Park
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and Smita Wagh (2000) that represents the strength of the patents rights laws in each
country of interest. The panel data contains an annual country level data over 20 years
(1981-2000)
The fiscal policy variables considered in equation (5) are: taxes on profits and
capital gains as a percent of total tax revenue (distortionary), taxes on goods and
services as a percent of total tax revenue (non-distortionary), government capital
expenditure as a percent of GDP (this is an indicator of government acquisition of
fixed assets), and government final consumption expenditure as a percent of GDP.
The control variables consist of: GDP growth which represents the domestic demand
on R& D , high-tech exports as a percent of total exports which represent the foreign
demand on R & D (high-tech exports are the sum of exports of pharmaceutical
products, office machines and computers, consumer electronics, instruments, and
aerospace), the number of scientists and engineers per million of population and the
number of researchers in business R & D sector which represents the supply side of
R&D, patent rights index which represent the rule of law, and gross fixed capital
formation as a percent of GDP which represent the investment in intermediate goods
(machinery and equipments). We also included the interest rate since it represents the
channel through which budget imbalances affect business R& D investment.
Government R & D is included as a control variable to check for complementarity with
business R& D. A ll variables are in log form.
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For equation ( 6), the fiscal policy variables considered are budget balance and
income taxes. The control variables are; GDP growth, high tech exports, patent rights
index, the number of scientists and engineers, and business R&D.

Results
As we mentioned above, the model is estimated in a fixed effect two stage
least squares framework. We estimate equation (5) in four different specifications; the
first and the third include gross fixed capital formation while the second and the forth
include government capital expenditure. In specifications (1) and (2) we use the total
number of scientists and engineers while in specifications (3) and (4) we use the
number of researchers in business R & D sector. The results of the OLS and the two
stage least square estimation are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 for equation (5) and
in Table 6 for equation (6). Table 3 contains the variables' descriptive statistics.
Regarding the fiscal policy variables in equation (5), we incorporate taxes on
profits and taxes on goods and services in all specifications while government capital
expenditure appears only in specification (2) and (4). Since interest rate is the channel
through which budget surplus/ deficit affect business R & D , we include it in all
specifications.
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Table 3
Statistical Description

Variables
Business R&D as a percent of
GDP
Government R&D as a percent
of GDP
Budget surplus as a percent of
GDP
Taxes on profits and capital
gains as a percent of total taxes
Government capital expenditure
as a percent of GDP
High-tech exports as a percent
of total exports
GDP growth
Patent rights index
Gross fixed capital formation as
a percent of GDP
Number of researchers in
business R&D sector
Number of scientists and
engineers
Interest rate

Mean

Max.

Min.

1.12

Standard
Deviation
0.52

2.41

0.19

0.28

0.11

0.57

0.06

-3.88

3.7

4.3

-14.8

41.01

15.5

75.4

16.3

6.19

2.9

18.2

1.5

15

9.5

47.1

1.4

2.8
3.7
19.8

2.4
0.51
5.7

20.8
4.8
32.1

-6.2

1060.67

2037.05

1037.5

607

2280.9

1068.8

6293

495

10.2

3.7

22.2

2.06

2.1
2.4

The exclusion of the budget balance variable from equation (5) and take it as
an exogenous variable in equation ( 6), helps in satisfying the identification condition
for equation (5). We also include interest rate, government capital expenditure, gross
fixed capital formation, and taxes on goods and services as unique regressors in
equation (5). On the other hand, the effect of government consumption expenditure on
business R & D is found insignificant in every specification and thus it is dropped from
the regression.
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Table 4
Fixed Effects OLS Estimation of the Effect of Fiscal Policy on Business R& D
(equation-5)
Variable
Taxes on profits
Taxes on goods and
services
Government capital
expenditure
GDP growth
High-tech exports
scientists and
engineers
researchers in
business sector
Patent rights index
Gross fixed capital
formation
Interest rate

( 1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.34
(3 .0 )***
-0.03
(-.49)

0.6
(3 .9 )***
-0.07
(-0.9)

0.3
(3 .4 )***
-0.04
(-0.7)

0.21

-----

0.39
(3 .4 )***
0.04
(0.7)
0.19
(5 .7 )***
0.003
(1.07)

-----

(4 .6 )***
( 1. 1)
0.17
(3 .8 )***
0.52
(8 .4 )***

0.02
(0.59)
0.24
(5 .3 )***
0.47
(7 3 )* **

0.006
(2.14)**
0.013
(0.38)
-----

-----

-----

-----

0.56
(17.3)

0.35
(1.98)**
-0.2
(- 2 .2) * * *

0.53
(3 .0 )***

0.002

0.05
(0 .8)
-0.05
(- 1.2)

0.02
(1.67)*
-0.21
(-3 .2 )***
-0.08
(-2 .7 )***
0.17
(4 .1 8 )***

0.5
(1 4 .6 )***
0.13
(1.24)

0.03

(0.04)
Government R & D

0.02
(0.5)

-----

0.1
(2 9 )* **

-----0.001
(-0.05)

0.22
(5 .0 7 )***

Notes:
-Business enterprise expenditure on R & D is the dependent variable.
-t-statistics are in parentheses.
-Coefficients are significant at * * * 1%, * * 5%, and * 10%.
The two stage least squares analysis shows that interest rate has the expected
negative sign and it is significant most of the specifications. Government capital
expenditure, which represents government spending to acquire fixed nonmilitary
capital assets and includes capital grants, has a positive and significant effect on
business R& D . The positive sign associated with government capital expenditure is
expected since it represents the government's demand on capital goods, which
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stimulates R& D. This result suggests that government capital expenditure and
business R & D are complements. However, when we replace the government capital
expenditure with gross fixed capital formation in the first and the third specification,
we get a negative and significant sign. There are two explanations for this negative
sign: the first, according to Grossman and Helpman (1991), is that since gross fixed
capital formation represents the intermediate goods sector, it is expected that R & D
and intermediate goods sector are inversely related as both sectors depend heavily on
scientists and engineers. The second explanation, proposed by Bebczuk (2002), is that
countries engage more actively in R& D only after the diminishing returns of physical
capital start threatening the country’s growth prospects.
Contrary to the well known negative effect of income tax on private
investment, tax on income and profits have a positive and significant effect on
business R & D investment in all specifications. This is because of R & D tax credits
offered to qualified private firms in most OECD countries. This tax credit is usually
offered to firms that succeed in increasing their R & D investment over the previous
years, which means that firms w ill not benefit from the tax credit unless they increase
their R&D. Because the credit can be applied only against the tax liability, higher
profit tax motivates additional R& D to find tax relief. This means that profit tax and
R & D tax credit are likely to be highly correlated. The coefficients associated with
taxes on income and profits capture the effect of taxes in the presence of R & D tax
credit. Table 7 shows the nature of R & D tax incentives in some of the OECD
countries.
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Table 5
Fixed Effects 2SLS Estimation of the Effect of Fiscal Policy on Business R& D
(equation-5)
Variable
Taxes on profits
Taxes on goods
and services
Government
capital
expenditure
GDP growth
High-tech exports
Scientists and
engineers
Researchers in
business sector
Patent rights index
Gross fixed capital
formation
Interest rate
Government R& D

( 1)

( 2)

(3)

(4)

0.36
(3 .0 )***

0.76
(4 .6 )***

0.32
(3 .4 )***

0.47
(3 .6 )***

-0.04
(-0.5)

-0.043
(-0.5)

-0.053
(-0 .8)

0.062
(0.92)

0.21

-----

0.23
(5 .9 )***

0.007
( 2.2)* *
0.09
(0.23)

0.003
(1.73)*
(2 .6) * * *

-----

-----

0.55
(1 4 .7 )***

0.46
(1 1 .0 7 )***

-----

(4 .3 )***
0.03
(0.9)

0.11
(2 .3 )**
0.47
(7 i ) * * *

0.005
(1.65)*
0.18
(3 .6 )***
0.37
(5 .4 )***

0.43
(2 .2)* *
-0.14
(-3.9) * * *

0.58
(3 .1 )***

-.02
(-1.4)
-0.04
(- 0 .66)

-0.1
(- 2 . 1)* *
0.03
(0.45)

—

0.11

0.02

0.22

(1.47)
-0.22
(-2 9 ) * **
-0.07
(-1.93)*
0.17
(3 .7 )***

(1.7)*
-----0.04
(-1.71)*
0.23
(4.8)***

Notes:
-Business enterprise expenditure on R& D is the dependent variable.
-t-statistics are in parentheses.
-Instrumental variables are the lagged values of the explanatory variables.
-Coefficients are significant at * * * 1%, * * 5%, and * 10%
In all specifications, although taxes on goods and services are found to have
the expected negative sign, they are found to be insignificant. Taxes on goods and
services are non-distortionary in the sense that they do not affect the business R & D
investment decision. Government R & D is found to be complement with business
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R & D in the third and forth specifications: a 1% increase in government R & D leads to
0.23% increase in business R&D.

Table 6
Fixed Effects OLS and 2SLS Estimation of Government R & D Determinants
(equation-6)

Variable
Budget surplus as % of GDP
Taxes on profits as % of total taxes
GDP growth
High-tech Exports % of total exports

OLS

2SLS

0.28
(2 .2)* *

(1.9 8)**

0.12
(1.13)
0.013
(3 .5 )***

0.12
(1.03)
0.015
(3 .5 )***

0.01

0.013
(0.26)

(0 .21)
Number of scientists and engineers

0.03
(4 7^ ***

Patent rights index

0.24
(1.3)
0.17
(2 .2)* *

Business R & D

0.21

0.03
(4 .8 )***
0.104
(0.51)
0.18
(2 .01) * *

Notes:
-Government expenditure on R & D is the dependent variable.
-t-statistics are in parentheses.
-Instrumental variables are the lagged values of the explanatory variables
-Coefficients are significant at * * * 1%, * * 5%, and * 10%

A ll the control variables are found to have the expected signs. Patent rights,
GDP growth, number of scientists and engineers, number of researchers in business
R& D sector, and high-tech exports are found to have positive and significant effects
on business investment in R&D. The results of the two stage least squares did not
change much compared with the ordinary least square, in terms of significancy,
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except for two variables: GDP growth and interest rate which become significant in
most of the specifications. Table 5 shows these results.

Table 7
R & D Tax Incentives
Australia

A special depreciation allowance of 150% for R&D expenditure.

Canada

20% of total R&D expenditure.

France

USA

50% credit on the increase over the previous year’s R&D expenditure.
20% credit on R&D spending exceeding the largest previous annual R&D
expenditure.
A tax credit of 20% of the level of R&D and an additional 40% tax credit of the
incremental R&D over the last two years.
Capital expenditure on equipment used for “scientific research” in the UK
qualifes for a 100% first year allowances under the Scientific Research
Allowance (SRA).
20% credit on R&D spending exceeding the average of the last 3 years regular
R&D expenditure, and 20% of the basic research payments.

Italy

No special tax depreciation provisions or credits are given on R&D expenditure.

Germany

No special tax depreciation provisions or credits are given on R&D expenditure.

Japan
Spain
UK

Source: Internal Revenue Services website and Bloom, G riffith, and Reenen (2000)
Table 6 shows that government R & D is positively related to GDP per capita
growth, number of scientists and engineers, and business R & D investment. The
positive relationship between government and business R & D suggests a
complementarity between the two types of R&D. This result is compatible with the
findings of Albert Hu (2000) and about two third of the empirical studies surveyed by
David et al (1999)11. On the other hand, budget surplus seems to have a positive and
significant impact on government R& D expenditure while income taxes are found to

11 David, Hall, and Toole (1999) find that complementarity appears more prevalent among the
subgroup of studies that have investigated this relationship at the industry and national economy levels.
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be insignificant in the two methods; two stage least squares and OLS. Other control
variables, patent rights and high tech exports, are found to be insignificant.

Conclusion
In this paper we present a simple model of fiscal policy and business
investment in research and development. In our theoretical model we study the effect
of four fiscal variables on business R&D: budget imbalance, taxes on income and
profits (distortionary taxes), taxes on goods and services (non-distortionary taxes),
and government productive expenditure. Regarding the tax variables, it has been
shown that— contrary to the normal negative relationship between taxes on profits and
private investment— the effect of profit taxes on business R & D investment could be
positive because of the R & D tax credits. A fiscal policy of incremental R & D tax
credit with a significant tax burden on firms' profits is expected to be effective in
inducing private firms to increase their R& D. Also, we show that budget deficit
causes a decline in business R & D investment due to the crowding out effect.
Additionally, taxes on goods and services could have an indirect effect on business
investment in R & D through their negative effect on the market size of high-tech
products. The empirical model in this paper is applied to a sample of 14 high-income
OECD countries over the period 1981-2000. The fixed effects two stage least squares
model shows that taxes on income and profits are found to have the expected positive
effect on business investment in R & D since almost all OECD countries in the sample,
except Germany and Italy, apply the incremental R & D tax credit. Regarding taxes on
goods and services, we get the expected negative sign but the coefficients are
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insignificant in all specifications. The impact of interest rate, the channel through
which budget imbalances affect business R& D , is found to be negative, confirming
the crowding out hypothesis.
We also examine the effect of two types of government productive
expenditure on business investment in R&D: government capital expenditure and
government current expenditure. We find a positive and significant effect of the
former while the later has insignificant effect in all specifications. In addition,
government R & D is found to be complement with business R&D. Other control
variables such as patent rights, GDP growth, number of scientists and engineers,
number of researchers in the business R & D sector, high-tech exports, and gross fixed
capital formation are found to have the expected positive sign except for gross fixed
capital formation which is found to have a negative effect on business R&D.
W ith regards to government R& D , we find that government R & D is
significantly affected by budget surplus but not by income taxes. Government R & D is
positively related to GDP per capita growth, number of scientists and engineers, and
business R & D investment. Again, this suggests a complementarity between
government and business R&D.
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ESSAY 3
G O VERN M ENT R & D A N D ECONOM IC GROW TH: A D Y N A M IC PANEL
D A TA ANALYSIS OF OECD COUNTRIES

Introduction
Governments in developed economies play a vital role in stimulating research
and development activities either directly by undertaking public R & D or indirectly by
using fiscal policy instruments such as R & D subsidies, allowances, profit taxes and
R & D tax credit. Lenjosek and Mansour (1999) and Jones and Williams (1998) show
that government intervention in the R & D sector is important since the market system
tends to underinvest in R & D because of non-excludability associated with the
creation of technology and knowledge.
In the R & D literature, studies that aim at measuring the rate of return to R & D
distinguish between the private rate of return to R& D , Griliches (1979) and Bronwyn
H all (1996), for example, and the social rate of return to R& D , Jones and W illiams
(1998) and Lederman and Maloney (2003). The former refers to the estimation of rate
of return to R & D using a firm's own R & D as the explanatory variable (the returns to
the individual or organization undertaking the R & D ) while the later attempts to
capture interfirm technology spillovers by focusing at the industry level12.
The majority of empirical studies that measure the rate of return to
government R & D expenditure are at the firm or industry level. Griliches (1980),

12 Jones and Williams (1998) indicate that since productivity gains may not be reflected in the
developing firm's total factor productivity and may rather show up downstream, aggregation to the
industry level helps to mitigate productivity measurement problems. On the other hand, Lichtenberg
(1995) shows that total factor productivity equals the marginal product of knowledge capital times
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Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991), and Battelsman (1990) have found that government
funded R & D has zero or negative return in firms in the U.S. Nevertheless, Mansfield
(1984) and Lichtenberg (1985), among others, have found that federal R & D has a
positive impact on firms' own R & D investment. Bronwyn Hall (1996) has shown that
similar result hold in other countries such as Germany and Norway. One explanation
behind the zero return to federal R & D at the firm or industry level is that the
government is the major purchaser of the products of these industries and thus, both
prices and output for these industries are expected to convey little information about
true productivity. In other words, R & D is not subject to a market test, Bronwyn Hall
(1996).
In a cross-country study using country level data, Lichtenberg (1992) finds
that the social marginal product of government-funded research is much lower than
that of private-funded research. In most of the estimates, the social marginal product
of government research is insignificantly different from zero. On the other hand, Hall
and Mairesse (1995) find that the returns to R& D in France were 50 percent higher
for those firms for which the government funded more than 20 percent of their R&D.
Few studies distinguish between civil and defense R & D and examine the effect of
defense R & D expenditure on economic growth. Poole and Bernard (1992),
Lichtenberg (1995), and Morales-Ramos (2002) find a negative impact of defense
R&D on total factor productivity.

R&D share of GDP, and since the rate of knowledge capital depreciation rate is zero, the marginal
product of knowledge may be interpreted as the social rate of return to investment in R&D.
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In this paper, we measure the social rate of return to government R & D in
thirteen high income OECD countries. In doing so, we first disaggregate total
government expenditure on R & D into two categories: civil and defense R&D.
Furthermore, we disaggregate civil government R & D into three subcategories: civil
government R & D for economic development programs, civil government R & D for
health and environmental programs, and civil government R & D for general university
funds. This disaggregation helps us in identifying the type of government R& D , if
any, that has a positive impact on economic growth and thus, to decide whether it is
more useful for the country to increase the government funded R & D or it is better to
replace it by fiscal incentives to the business sector engaging in the same type of R& D
activities.
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), we estimate a dynamic panel model
using the Generalized Method of Moments estimator (G M M ) to overcome the
problem of inconsistency associated with the OLS estimator of a dynamic panel
model. Since we are conducting our study at the macro level, we are using country
level data over the period 1981-2000.
In the next section we briefly discuss the relevant literature. Section 3 presents
the theoretical background for the empirical model of R & D and economic growth,
and section 4 describes the econometric model, data, and results. Section 5 contains
the conclusion.
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Literature Review
We briefly list some relevant papers.
-Bayoumi, Coe, and Helpman (1999)
Their simulation results suggest that R & D and R & D spillover play an important role
in boosting growth in industrial and developing countries.
-Morales-Ramos (2002)
Using TSLS method, the demand-supply model results show that defense R & D
crowds out growth indirectly through its negative impact on investment.
-Poole and Bernard (1992)
The SUR multiple regression analysis shows that military R& D has a negative impact
on total factor productivity.
Lederman and Maloney (2003)
According to them, the social rate of return to R & D in developing countries is around
78% and it decreases with development. In addition, they conclude that financial
depth, protection of intellectual property rights, government capacity to mobilize
resources, and the quality of research institutions are the main reasons why R& D
effort rises with the level of development.
-Lichtenberg (1995)
Both micro and aggregate estimates of social rate of return to investment in
government funded, largely defense-related, R & D are insignificantly different from
zero.
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-Hall (1996)
She finds that the rate of return to federal R & D is measured to be zero in the US and
several other countries.
-Jones and Williams (1998)
The present a conservative estimate of the social return to R& D indicate that optimal
investment in R & D is more than two to four times actual investment.
-Lichtenberg (1992)
Privately funded R & D investment is found to have a significant positive effect on
productivity. In addition, the social marginal product of government funded R & D
appears to be much lower than that of private R&D.
-Hu (2000)
Using firm level data in China, Hu finds a strong link between private R & D and
firm's productivity while the direct contribution of government R & D to productivity
is found to be insignificant.
-Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984)
Industry level data show a strong relationship between the intensity of private R& D
expenditure, but not federal R& D , and subsequent growth in productivity.
-Griliches and Mairesse (1984)
The cross-sectional analysis of the productivity o f 133 US large firms during the
period 1966-1977 shows high estimates of the importance of R & D investment at the
firm level relative to physical capital.
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-Griliches and Clark(1984)
R& D investment has a significant positive effect on the growth rate of total factor
productivity at the business level. In addition, the fall in R& D intensity could explain
about 20% of the decline in productivity growth in the high-tech sector.
-G riffith, Redding, and Reenen (1999)
They investigate the role of R& D in stimulating productivity growth in eleven OECD
countries at the industry level. They find evidence that R & D plays two roles: its direct
effect on productivity growth and its important role in technology transfer.

The Rate of Return to R & D
Lichtenberg (1992) extends the augmented Solow model presented by
Mankiw, Romer, and W eil (1992), which includes the stock of human capital (H t) in
the production function, by proposing a further extension: the inclusion of the stock of
research capital R which is accumulated via investment in research and development,
Ir-

Yt= AtR? H $ K f L?

(1)

& = ( l- & ) & - i + /»

(2)

H t = (.1 “ £ n )H t - 1+ Im

(3)

K , = ( X - & ) K , - i + I k,

(4)

Where Y, is real output, A is an index of total factor productivity, K is the stock
of physical capital, L is labor input, Rt.j is the stock of research and development in
the previous period, SR, SH, and SK are the depreciation rates. Lichtenberg continues
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to maintain the constant return to scale assumption in the production function by
assuming that 7t + 0 + a + /3 = 1. L and A are assumed to grow exogenously at rates n
and g and thus, the quantity of effective labor, AL, grows at rates n+g. Following
Mankiw, Romer, and W eil (1992) (henceforth M R W ), Lichtenberg defines: S k = 1 k/ Y ,
the fraction of output devoted to fixed investment; S h = I h / Y , the fraction of output
devoted to human capital; S r = I r/ Y , the fraction of output devoted to research and
development (the ratio of R& D to GDP); k=K/AL, capital per unit of effective labor;
and y=Y/AL, output per unit of effective labor. He also assumed that <$«=<$//,=<5k=0.03
andg=0.0513.
Without the inclusion of human and research capital, the observable sources of
cross country variation in steady state income per capita ( y * ) are variations in SK and
14.

In y* = constant +

a

(1 - a )

In SKi -

a

(1 - a )

In (nt + g + dK) + ui

(5)

Adding human and research capital, Lichtenberg obtains a generalized version
of equation (5) which includes as regressors rates of investment in human capital and
research as well as physical capital:

13 MRW assume that g, a, and SK are invariant across countries and that g=0.02, SK =0.03.
14 MRW show that the evolution of the capital per unit of effective labor, k, is given by
lc (t )

= s k(t)a - ( n + g + dK)k (t), where s is the saving rate, and that k converges to a steady state value
k * defined by: k * = [s/(n+g+ (5ic)]1/<l a>. Substituting the later equation into the production function and
taking logs leads to the steady state income per capita shown in equation (5).
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In y* = constant +

a

(1 - a - d - n )

n

+

(1 - a - 9 - n )

In SRi -

e

In Ski +

Q .-a-9-n)

a +9+n

(\-a-0-n)

In SHi

(6)

In (n{ + g + SK) + Ui

In this model SR represents the total R& D investment to GDP ratio. To derive
an expression for income per capita at time t, Lichtenberg assumes that income per
capita at time t, In y(t), is a weighted average of productivity at time zero (initial
productivity), In y(0), and of In y * :
,
In y (t) = ( l - e * ) In y + erf>t
M‘ In
y(0)

(7)

where the weights depend on t, the higher is t the closer y(t) to y * , and on the
convergence rate /a which is given by: ju = (n + g + 8 k)(1- o.-6-k). Substituting (6) into
(7), we get:

lny(t), = ( l - e * )

n
(1 —(X—0 —71)

a
C\ - a - d - n )

In Sri -

In Ski +

a +0+n

C\ - a - 0 - 7 t )

9

(1 - a - d - r i )

In Sm

In (m + g + dK)i !> +

In y(0)+ ut

( 8)

Lichtenberg also derives an expression determining productivity growth by
subtracting In y(0) from both sides in equation ( 8):

a

In y (t)t - lny(0)t= (1 -e ^ )

n

(1- a - 9 - 7t)

In S,R i

(\

-

- a - 9-n)

In Sia +

0

(1 - a - 0 - n )

In Sm

OC+0 + 7T
In (m + g + 8r) - In y(0)i I + w;
(l-a-0-ft)
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(9)

In estimating equation (9), Lichtenberg (1992) separates R & D investment, SR,
as private and government R & D 15. OECD data permit us to distinguish between
business and government R & D and disaggregate government R & D into civil and
defense R& D . In addition, civil R & D is disaggregated into three different categories:
civil government R & D for economic development programs, civil government R & D
for health and environment programs, civil government R&D for general university
funds. Our goal is to measure the rate of return to each type of government R&D.

The Econometric Model
The following specification represents a dynamic panel economic growth
model16:
yut = y y i,t - 1+ (p'Xi>t + a'Rit + jUi + s, + uit,

(10)

Where yt, t is the log difference of GDP per capita of country i in period t, yt, t - 1 is
the log GDP per capita in the previous year, Xiit is a vector of control variables which
includes: gross fixed capital formation as a proxy of physical investment, labor force
participation rate, population growth, and credit to private sector as a proxy of
financial depth, and Ri:t is the vector of different types of research and development
expenditure, f i i is the unobserved individual country specific effect,

et

is the

15 In a different study, Lichtenberg (1995) estimates the rate of return to defense and non-defense R&D
by taking government funded R&D as a proxy of defense R&D and private as a proxy of non-defense
R&D.
16 We follow Coe and Helpman (1995) in estimating the model based on a difference specification,
growth rate, rather than in level since various variables are clearly trended and thus the estimated
relationship may be spurious if the error term is not stationary.
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unobserved time specific effect, and w,,( captures the effect of the unobserved
variables.
Following Cheng Hsiao (2002), it is known that in models with lagged
dependent variables the maximum likelihood estimator (M LE ) or the least square
dummy variables estimator (LSD V) under the fixed effect formulation is no longer
consistent because of the asymptotic bias of the M LE of y. This bias is caused by
having to eliminate the unknown individual effects from each observation, which
creates the correlation between the explanatory variables and the residuals in the
transformed model. Hsiao indicates that a consistent estimator of y can be obtained by
using instrumental variables.
We follow Arellano and Bond (1991) and employ lagged levels as instruments
in a Generalized Method of Moments (G M M ) formulation. They show that
differencing a dynamic panel data model gives the transformed error a moving
average structure, M A (n), which is correlated with the differenced lagged dependent
variable. To overcome this problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using
instruments dated t-n and earlier. In addition, Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2003)
indicate that the advantage of G M M over simple instrumental variables' estimators is
that if heteroskedasticity is present, the G M M estimator is more efficient than the
simple instrumental variables’ estimator, whereas if heteroskedasticity is not present,
the G M M estimator is no worse asymptotically than the instrumental variables'
estimators.
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Data
The sample of study contains 13 high-income OECD countries: Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain, United Kingdom, and USA. Data are collected from several sources: World
Bank W D I and International Financial Statistics (IFS) are the main source for the
control variables. OECD database is the main source of government R & D and
business R & D expenditure. The panel data contain an annual country level data over
20 years (1981-2000)
The main variables of interest are government R & D expenditure, which is
disaggregated into two main types: total civil government R & D and defense R&D.
Also, we are interested in the effect of business R & D expenditure. Moreover, civil
government R & D is disaggregated into three types: 1) civil government R & D for
economic development programs as a percent of civil government budget
appropriations or outlays for R&D: R&D programs financed for the purpose of the
advancement of agriculture, fishery, forestry; industry; energy; and infrastructure and
general planning of land use, 2) civil government R & D for health and environmental
programs as a percent of civil government budget appropriations or outlays for R&D:
R & D programs funded for the purpose of the protection and improvement of human
health; social structures and relationships; control and care of the environment; and
for the exploration and exploitation of earth, and 3) civil government R & D for
general university funds as a percent of civil government budget appropriations or
outlays for R&D: R & D content of grants to the higher education sector. These three
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types of civil government R & D expenditure account for about 70% to 87% of total
civil government R & D 17. Defense budget R & D is defined as all defense R&D
financed by government, including military nuclear and space but excluding civilian
R & D financed by ministries of defense. R & D in the business enterprise sector covers
private enterprises and institutes serving such enterprises.
Two control variables are added to the regression: labor force participation
rate, and gross fixed capital formation. The effect of credit to the private sector, as a
proxy of financial depth in the economy, and population growth were estimated and
found insignificant in all specifications and thus excluded from the regression.
Because the sample size is somewhat small (13 countries), we could not use a panel
of five-year averages.

Results

We estimate equation (10) under two different specifications. In the first, we
estimate the rate of return to total civil government R& D , defense R& D , and business
R&D expenditure. In the second specification, we disaggregate the civil government
R&D into the three categories described before and estimate the rate of return to each
type in addition to defense and business R&D. Rates of return to both current and
lagged values of R & D are estimated. We report only the estimates of the lagged
values since it is likely that economic growth is affected more by past year's R& D

17 OECD data give five different types of civil government R&D expenditure, but since we lack data on
two types in most countries in our sample, civil government R&D for space programs and for non
oriented research programs, we focus on measuring the rate of return of the three types of civil
government R&D mentioned above.
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compared with current R&D. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 represent the estimation of the rate of
return to lagged government R & D for the first and the second specification,
respectively. The two specifications pass the Sargan test for the validity of the
instruments and the Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of
second order is zero. Table 8 contains the statistical description of the variables.

Table 8
Statistical Description
Variable

Mean

Business R& D as % of GDP

1.06

Standard
Deviation
0.49

Max.

M in.

2.41

0.19

C ivil government R & D as %
of total government R&D
Defense R & D as % of total
government R & D
C ivil R& D for economic
development programs as %
of civil government R&D
C ivil R& D for health and
environment programs as %
of civil government R&D
C ivil R& D for general
university fund as % of civil
government R & D
GDP per capita growth

85.6

18.4

100

30.7

14.3

18.6

69.3

0

32.3

10.03

64.3

11.6

16.8

9.4

57.9

7.4

31.2

8.2

49.2

15.2

2.8

2.4

20.8

-6.2

Labor force participation rate

70.3

7.1

83.9

59.6

Gross fixed capital formation
as % of GDP

19.1

5.4

29.4

2.4

Table 9 shows that lagged civil government R & D affects GDP per capita
growth positively and significantly. The rate of return to civil government R & D
expenditure equals 0.027. Since the coefficient (er) in equation (10) is the output
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growth elasticity of R & D investment— a one percent increase in civil government
R& D expenditure leads to 0.027 percent increase in GDP per capita growth. On the
other hand, the coefficient of lagged defense R & D seems to be insignificantly
different from zero. This result matches with the findings of Lichtenberg (1995).
Lagged business sector R & D expenditure, which is the largest among the three
sectors funding R & D activities in most OECD countries: business sector, the
government, and universities, positively and significantly affects GDP per capita
growth.

Table 9
G M M Estimation of the Rate of Return to Lagged C ivil Government and Defense
R&D
Variable

Coefficient
-0.059
(-1.77)*
0.027
(4 .0 5 )***
0.0005
(0.75)
0.013
(7 .6 7 )***

Lagged GDP per capita
Lagged civil government R&D
Lagged defense R&D
Lagged business R & D

0.001
(0.63)
0.021
(2.08)**
1

Gross fixed capital formation
Labor force participation rate
Sargan test (Prob > chi2)
Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation
Notes:
-Growth in GDP per capita is the dependent variable,
-z-statistics are in parenthesis.
-Coefficients are significant at * * * 1%, * * 5%, and * 10%

Z=-0.84
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The rate of return to business R & D expenditure is 0.013. Labor force
participation rate also positively affects GDP per capita growth, while gross fixed
capital formation seems to be insignificantly different from zero. Lagged GDP per
capita has the expected negative effect on current GDP per capita growth. It is useful
to note that these results did not change when we use the current values of R&D
variables.
The following table, Table 10, represents the estimation of lagged government
R& D expenditure when it is disaggregated into the three categories mentioned above.
It shows that lagged civil government R& D for economic development programs and
for general university funds positively and significantly affect GDP per capita growth;
the rates of return are 0.033 and 0.07 respectively. The third type of civil government
R&D, lagged civil government R& D for health and environment programs, is found
to be insignificant. This is somewhat expected since government R & D for health and
environment programs are devoted to the production of non-economic benefits,
promoting health and environment, which do not immediately appear in the GDP.
Comparing these results with the estimates of the rate of return to current values of
disaggregated government R&D, we find that the lagged values give us slightly better
estimates in terms of magnitudes. The rate of return to lagged government R & D for
general university funds is 0.07 compared with 0.002 in case of current government
R&D for the same programs.
Lagged defense R & D has a negative and significant effect on GDP per capita
growth. This supports the defense R & D crowding out hypothesis and the famous
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tradeoff between guns and butter as explained by Lichtenberg (1995): the greater the
fraction of R & D a society devotes to guns (defense R & D ) rather than butter (civil
R & D ) the lower its measured growth w ill be18.

Table 10
G M M Estimation of the Rate of Return to Lagged C ivil and Defense R&D: C ivil
Government R & D is Disaggregated into Three Categories
Variable

Coefficient

Lagged GDP per capita

-0.27
(-3 .0 6 )***
0.033
(5 .3 )***
0.006
( 1.01)
0.07
(6 .4 4 )***
-0.001
(-2 .7 2 )***

Lagged civil government R & D for economic development
programs
Lagged civil government R & D for health and environment
programs
Lagged civil government R & D for general university funds
Lagged defense R & D

0.012

Lagged business R&D

(7 .8 9 )***
0.013
(1.07)
0.06
(4 .5 7 )***

Gross fixed capital formation
Labor force participation rate
Sargan test (Prob > chi2)
Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation
Notes:
-Growth in GDP per capita is the dependent variable,
-z-statistics are in parenthesis.
-Coefficients are significant at * * * 1%, * * 5%, and * 10%.

1
Z= -1.7

18 The defense R&D crowding out hypothesis implies that due to scarcity of resources, an increase in
defense R&D affects negatively other activities in the economy assuming resources are fully and
efficiently employed. For more details see Morales-Ramos (2002), "Defense R&D Expenditure: the
Crowding-out Hypothesis", Defense and Peace Economics, Vol. 13(5), pp. 365-383.
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This negative impact is presumably reduced by spillovers from the defense
R&D sector to the private R & D sector which are not captured in our model. The rate
of return to business R & D is found to be very close to its figure in the first
specification and equals to 0 .012.

Conclusion
This paper is an attempt to estimate the rate of return to government and
business R & D when the former is disaggregated into different subcategories. We
extend Lichtenberg's (1992) work to include disaggregated data of high-income
OECD countries in order to estimate the social rate of return to civil government
R&D and defense R& D . In addition, we also measure the rate of return to the three
major categories of civil government R&D: civil government R& D for economic
development programs, civil government R & D for health and environment programs,
and civil government R & D for general university funds.
Using the Arellano-Bond (1991) technique of employing lagged levels as
instruments in a Generalized Method of Moments (G M M ) formulation, we estimate a
dynamic panel data model that consists of 13 high-income OECD countries over the
period 1981-2000. The results show that contrary to most empirical studies that report
a social rate of return to total government R & D expenditure to be insignificantly
different from zero, this paper finds that civil government R & D expenditure has a
positive and significant effect on GDP per capita growth. Furthermore, when we
disaggregate total civil government R & D into the three categories mentioned above,
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we find that both civil government R& D for economic development programs and
civil government R & D for general university funds have positive and significant
effect on economic growth. C ivil government R & D for health and environment
programs is found to be insignificant, which is expected since such programs produce
services that most likely do not appear in the GDP. The results did not change much
when we use the current instead of lagged values of the disaggregated R & D variables.
Lagged defense R & D is found to have either insignificant or negative effect
on economic growth. This result supports the crowding out hypothesis associated with
defense R& D. In the short run, due to limited resources, if more is devoted to defense
R&D, less is available for civil government R& D and this might have a negative
impact on economic growth. It would be interesting to study the effect of defense
R& D on economic growth in the long run, which this paper doesn't address. Finally,
business R & D is found to have a positive and significant effect on GDP per capita
growth in all specifications.
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